Iran will neither reopen the Strait of Hormuz nor return to negotiations until Washington implements seven conditions conveyed through mediators, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said in an interview with Drop Site News reported by Iran’s state news agency IRNA. Rezaei said Tehran preferred a diplomatic settlement but retained the ability to sustain military operations and expand its targets if fighting resumed.
He described Iran’s management of the strait as a security priority rather than simply a means of collecting transit fees. Charges for security, insurance and environmental protection could form part of future arrangements, he said, but the waterway’s importance to Tehran extended beyond revenue.
Rezaei blamed the failure of an earlier understanding with Washington on the order in which commitments were implemented. In his account, Iran restored maritime traffic before receiving the political and economic measures it expected, leaving Tehran with less leverage once the United States had secured its immediate objective. The seven conditions he said had since been submitted through intermediaries were not itemized in IRNA’s account.
He said Iran had reached an understanding with Oman on a new shipping corridor, with a substantial portion passing through waters under Iranian control. That arrangement did not amount to an immediate reopening, he said: Washington would first have to fulfill its commitments, after which Iran would decide whether to restore shipping under the proposed framework. Rezaei said Tehran would no longer accept an agreement dependent solely on political assurances.
He also disputed U.S. claims that the strait was open, characterizing some cargo movements along its southern edge as smuggling. He alleged that Iran had targeted an average of five vessels a night over the preceding two to three months. IRNA’s account supplied no independent evidence for that figure or for his characterization of the shipping operations.
In a response published in Drop Site’s original report, the White House maintained that oil was moving through Hormuz in record volumes and said the U.S. blockade would remain in force. It also denied that the United States would attack Iran before the midterm elections. Those statements presented a different assessment of the maritime situation from Rezaei’s account.
Rezaei said Iran’s missile and drone capabilities remained operational despite repeated attacks. He attributed their endurance to dispersed production, underground facilities, multiple launch systems and the ability to repair damage and replace losses. He provided no detailed inventory or production figures in the published account.
He warned that renewed fighting could expose additional U.S. assets in the region to attack, including cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilities. Iran had not used all its capabilities in earlier phases of the conflict, he said, and was preparing for a wider response.
On energy infrastructure, Rezaei said Iran did not seek to damage civilian facilities simply to harm neighboring economies. But he warned that installations supporting military operations, replacing disrupted energy supplies or helping sustain an economic blockade could enter Iran’s targeting calculations. His preferred alternative, he said, was a reciprocal arrangement keeping energy facilities, shipping routes and civilian infrastructure outside the conflict.
Rezaei said discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council countries covered measures to prevent unintended maritime clashes, improve communication about military movements and address foreign powers’ use of regional territory. He acknowledged substantial distrust and differing levels of willingness to engage with Tehran. Those discussions, he said, could support a broader security agreement but would not replace Iran’s conditions for reopening Hormuz.
He also rejected the suggestion that Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement operated as an Iranian military unit. While acknowledging political relations and Iranian support, he said the movement made its own operational decisions. He stressed that he was not announcing a joint Iranian-Yemeni decision to close Bab al-Mandab to commercial shipping.
Rezaei acknowledged that a prolonged blockade would hurt Iranian households, investment and parts of the economy. He argued that those costs would not necessarily compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands, and said Iran’s objective was to end the conflict on terms that reduced the likelihood of another war.