In a bold and controversial move, US President Donald Trump has formally linked the fate of the fragile Iran peace negotiations to the expansion of the Abraham Accords. On Monday, Trump issued a social media ultimatum declaring that it should be “mandatory” for six Muslim majority nations involved in the Iran talks to immediately sign the normalization agreements with Israel. While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are already members, the demand targets four key holdouts: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye, and Pakistan. Additionally, Trump insisted that Egypt and Jordan, which already have peace treaties with Israel should join the framework as well.
The initiative, which Trump said “should start with the immediate signing by Saudi Arabia and Qatar,” has thrown the already complex peace process into further disarray, raising critical questions about whether any of these countries are willing to pay the political price of normalization in exchange for an end to the devastating war with Iran.
Saudi Arabia is widely considered the ultimate prize of the Abraham Accords, and the kingdom has been the subject of intense US lobbying for years. However, the likelihood of Riyadh signing onto the accords as part of the Iran deal is currently very low, and the primary obstacle remains the Palestinian question. Saudi officials have repeatedly and consistently stated that they will not normalize relations with Israel without an “irreversible path” to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The destruction of Gaza and the rising death toll, now exceeding 72,000 Palestinians has only hardened this position.
While Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told Trump in late 2025 that the kingdom was open to joining the accords, he made it conditional on a “clear path” towards a Palestinian state. Furthermore, Riyadh is highly sensitive to public opinion in the Muslim world, and normalizing ties with Israel while Israeli forces continue to occupy Gaza and demolish homes in the West Bank would be a politically devastating move. The kingdom also has its own strategic calculus: it has been inching towards a historic normalization deal that would include a US defense treaty and civilian nuclear cooperation, but it is not willing to sacrifice its leadership on the Palestinian issue as a mere “add‑on” to an Iran deal. While the US may dangle security guarantees, Saudi Arabia is likely to hold out for a comprehensive regional settlement that addresses Palestinian statehood, not a rushed signature tied to a separate conflict with Iran.
Qatar finds itself in an exceptionally difficult position. Doha has played a crucial role throughout the war as a diplomatic intermediary and a key channel of communication between the US, Iran, and Hamas. Trump’s demand that Qatar “immediately” sign the Abraham Accords directly contradicts Qatar’s long‑standing foreign policy identity as a neutral mediator that maintains open channels to all sides, including Iran. While Qatar maintains unofficial economic ties with Israel, it has repeatedly stated that normalization cannot happen without a just resolution to the Palestinian issue.
The political climate in Doha is also shaped by intense public sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and any move towards official recognition of Israel would provoke a domestic backlash. Moreover, Qatar is deeply invested in the Iranian diplomatic process; Iranian envoys were in Doha just last week discussing the most sensitive issues in the deal. By signing the Abraham Accords at this moment, Qatar would risk alienating Tehran and destroying its credibility as a neutral arbiter. The likelihood is therefore that Qatar will politely decline or attempt to delay, arguing that its mediating role requires it to maintain distance from formal alliances.
Turkiye presents a unique case. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Pakistan, Ankara already maintains official diplomatic relations with Israel. The two countries agreed earlier this month to restore full diplomatic ties and return ambassadors, a step towards mending a relationship that has been volatile for years. However, the existence of formal ties does not mean that Ankara is ready to embrace a full normalization agenda. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been one of the most vocal critics of Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. Just last week, Erdogan stated that “Israel’s provocations must be neutralized” before any genuine peace can be built, referring to the US-Israeli attacks against Iran.
The Turkish public is overwhelmingly pro‑Palestinian, and any perceived embrace of Israel would be politically toxic. While Turkiye might technically be considered a signatory to the accords, the animosity and mistrust run deep, and Ankara is unlikely to engage in any substantive expansion of ties without a significant shift in Israeli policy. Erdogan’s government will likely continue to engage in diplomatic niceties with the US while publicly reiterating its support for the Palestinian cause and its opposition to Israeli aggression.
Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, yet its relationship remains a “cold peace” driven by strategic interests rather than genuine warmth. Cairo is already a member of the Abraham Accords framework, but its involvement has always been purely pragmatic: securing US aid, maintaining influence in Gaza, and ensuring regional stability. The Egyptian public, however, remains deeply hostile to Israel, and the government has consistently used its position to mediate between Hamas and Israel, not to deepen ties.
While Egypt will not break its peace treaty, the likelihood of Cairo actively expanding normalization as part of the Iran deal is extremely low. The Sisi regime is more concerned with the war in Sudan and the threat of Islamist militancy than with becoming a cheerleader for Israeli integration. Egypt’s role will likely remain that of a reluctant participant, honoring existing agreements but refusing to take any new steps that could inflame domestic sentiment or undermine its role as a key Arab power.
Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994, but the relationship is, if anything, even more strained than Egypt’s. Jordan has a majority Palestinian population, and the government has been one of the harshest critics of Israeli policies in Jerusalem and the West Bank. King Abdullah II has repeatedly warned that the continued expansion of settlements and the denial of Palestinian rights will eventually force Jordan to reconsider its ties with Israel. Amman’s relationship with Israel is transactional, focused on water sharing and security cooperation.
The idea of Amman enthusiastically embracing the Abraham Accords is a fantasy. However, Jordan is also the most vulnerable of the Arab states; it is heavily dependent on US aid and cannot afford to completely sever ties. Nevertheless, the likelihood of Jordan taking any new proactive steps towards normalization as part of the Iran deal is virtually zero. The most likely scenario is a quiet reaffirmation of the status quo, with Jordan insisting that the Palestinian issue must be resolved before any further integration can occur.
Of all the countries on Trump’s list, Pakistan has delivered the most emphatic and immediate rejection. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated unequivocally that Pakistan will never recognize Israel, saying: “How can you sit with people whose word cannot be trusted for even a single day?” He noted that Pakistani passports do not even recognize Israel by name, a reflection of the country’s founding ideology. Pakistan was established as a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, and support for the Palestinian cause is deeply embedded in the national consciousness.
Pakistan’s military and political establishment has always maintained that recognition of Israel is conditional on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Furthermore, Islamabad is currently acting as the primary mediator between the US and Iran, a role that requires it to maintain neutrality. Signing the Abraham Accords would instantly destroy its credibility as a peacemakery. Pakistan’s stance is a firm red line that is highly unlikely to change regardless of US pressure.
The two Arab nations that have already embraced the accords are the UAE and Bahrain. Both countries normalized relations with Israel in 2020 under the original Abraham Accords, driven by a shared animosity towards Iran and a desire for economic and technological partnerships. Throughout the current war, the UAE has deepened its ties with Israel, even hosting Israeli military personnel and air defense systems.
For Abu Dhabi and Manama, the accords are a strategic success, and they will likely continue to advocate for expansion. However, even these countries face domestic unease, and they are not likely to pressure their larger neighbors to follow suit.
While Trump’s linkage of the Iran deal to the Abraham Accords has captured headlines, it is a strategic overreach that is likely to backfire. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are not ready to normalize relations without a solution to the Palestinian issue. Turkiye faces domestic political obstacles that make enthusiastic embrace impossible. Egypt and Jordan are already signatories but will not go further, and Pakistan holds firm on its red lines.