One year after the overthrow of Bashar al Assad and the arrival of President Ahmed al Sharaa’s Islamist-led government, Syria is formally in a new political phase. The former rebel commander, now head of state, has repositioned the country away from Tehran and Moscow and toward Washington, Gulf capitals, and Ankara, helping to secure relief from a portion of Western sanctions and to reopen some channels of trade and finance.
Yet the structural map of the country remains fragmented. Kurdish-led areas in the northeast resist integration into the new order, and southern regions such as Sweida continue to see tension and localized violence. The “new Syria” exists, but it rests on an unstable balance between armed actors, local authorities, and a population still living with war damage and economic collapse.
Despite the political shift, the humanitarian situation remains severe by almost every measure. UN assessments for 2025 estimate that about 16.5 million people in Syria need some form of humanitarian assistance, more than two thirds of the population, with around 7.1 million people still internally displaced and nearly two million classified as IDP returnees. UNHCR and OCHA reporting for 2024 put the figure even higher at 16.7 million people in need and describe Syria as hosting one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world, at roughly 7.2 million.
The socio-economic picture is equally stark. UN analyses suggest that approximately 90 per cent of Syrians live in poverty and about 12.9 million people are food insecure, with some 3 million facing severe food insecurity. Funding shortfalls have forced the World Food Programme to scale back operations, cutting assistance by nearly 80 per cent in 2024 and limiting regular aid to around 1.5 million people each month, even as overall needs rise.
Surveys and qualitative assessments confirm that Syrians themselves do not experience the “new phase” as a clear break from crisis. The recent “Voices from Syria 2025” report, based on consultations with women and girls across the country, finds that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance, with about 7 million still displaced. Respondents describe persistent gender-based violence, limited access to services, and shrinking humanitarian programmes as international funding declines.
Many community representatives speak of an environment where conflict intensity has decreased in some areas, but insecurity, economic collapse, and institutional weakness still shape daily life. Health assessments indicate that roughly half of health facilities are partially functioning or non-functional, while millions live in unsafe or makeshift shelters. For these groups, the end of Assad’s rule has not yet translated into predictable services or a credible social safety net.
The change of government has altered regional calculations on refugees. According to European asylum authorities, more than one million Syrian refugees and nearly two million internally displaced people have returned to Syria since Assad’s fall in December 2024, although violence and sectarian attacks continue in parts of the country. The European Union has updated its guidance, suggesting that some categories of Syrians, especially former opponents of the Assad regime or draft evaders, may face reduced risk, while minorities such as Alawites, Christians, Druze, LGBTQ+ people, and unprotected Palestinians may still qualify for protection.
In parallel, a UN-backed initiative has begun moving refugees back from Lebanon, offering financial incentives and transport for those who sign up. Early figures indicate that around 11,000 people have registered, with an ambition to reach between 200,000 and 400,000 returns during 2025. Since December 2024, more than 628,000 Syrians have returned from abroad, including about 191,000 from Lebanon. Returnees often arrive to damaged housing, limited services, and few jobs. Local testimonies collected by humanitarian agencies describe a difficult choice between remaining in precarious exile and going back to communities where infrastructure and security conditions are still uncertain.
Inside the country and abroad, critical voices question both the pace and direction of change. Syrian activists and analysts argue that, although the leadership has changed, core problems persist: weak rule of law, opaque security institutions, and a political environment that limits broad participation. Kurdish-led authorities warn against centralization under an Islamist-leaning government and stress the need for negotiated arrangements that protect local autonomy and minority rights.
Minority communities express their own concerns. European asylum guidance acknowledges ongoing risks for groups historically associated with the former regime and for religious or social minorities who fear retribution or marginalization under the new authorities. Humanitarian field reports note that women, in particular, remain exposed to violence and discrimination, even as they shoulder increasing economic and social responsibilities in households left without male breadwinners. For many, “new Syria” is less a clean break than a rearranged hierarchy within a still fragile state.
Alongside these criticisms, there are also more positive assessments. Some business groups, especially in government-held urban centres, point to a modest easing of sanctions pressure, improved prospects for cross-border trade, and efforts by the authorities to restore basic infrastructure and reopen schools. Local councils in different parts of the country report small but visible gains, such as repaired electricity lines, reopened markets, and better coordination with humanitarian agencies.
For segments of the population that have seen front-line fighting recede from their neighborhoods, the new order is judged primarily on whether it provides relative safety and a minimal economic horizon. Supporters of the government emphasize the end of large-scale regime bombardment, renewed engagement with Arab capitals, and the promise of a transition process including a new constitution and future elections.
These expectations, however, remain contingent on whether institutions can be built fast enough to reduce the gap between political rhetoric and everyday hardship.
The humanitarian system around Syria is entering its own period of contraction. UN appeals for the Syrian response in 2025 total about 3.19 billion dollars, targeting 10.3 million people with immediate assistance, yet as of mid-year the plan is barely funded. Globally, the UN has had to scale back its overall humanitarian appeal amid a sharp drop in donor support, with Syria no longer at the top of the priority list despite its scale of need.
Aid agencies warn that this combination of reduced funding and rising needs is forcing painful trade-offs. Programmes for women and girls, health services in remote areas, and early recovery projects that could underpin long-term stability are among those most at risk. Critics of Western policy argue that focusing on geopolitical engagement with the new Syrian authorities, while accepting steep cuts to humanitarian budgets, risks entrenching inequality and delaying genuine recovery. Others counter that only political normalization and economic reopening can generate the resources needed to move beyond continuous emergency relief.