A false flag operation is a military or political maneuver in which a party deliberately misattributed an action to an opponent, often to justify retaliation or manipulate public perception. These operations are not merely acts of deception; they serve specific strategic objectives—ranging from providing a pretext for war to curbing civil liberties or discrediting adversaries.
The origins of false flag tactics are debated. Some trace them to 16th-century anti-Catholic rhetoric, which accused Catholics of feigning religious faith while engaging in irreligious activities. Others point to pirates who, centuries ago, used the flags of friendly nations to deceive merchant ships and get close enough to launch an attack. While traditional false flag operations have become less common, they have evolved in the digital age particularly through cyberattacks, propaganda, and media manipulation. One of the most significant historical cases involving a suspected false flag operation was the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which ultimately led to U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War.
On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats attacked the USS Maddox (DD-731) while it was in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. This incident is well-documented and undisputed. However, the events of August 4, 1964, which led to escalated U.S. involvement in Vietnam, remain shrouded in controversy and conflicting reports.
Earlier that year, the U.S. had been involved in covert operations against North Vietnam. Under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A, South Vietnamese forces, with support from the U.S. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), launched a series of commando raids and intelligence-gathering missions along the North Vietnamese coast. These raids initially land-based but later shifting to mortar and rocket attacks from patrol boats met with limited success, often resulting in heavy casualties for South Vietnamese forces.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy conducted reconnaissance and signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions offshore in the Tonkin Gulf, known as Desoto patrols. These missions aimed to gather intelligence on North Vietnamese coastal defenses, radar systems, and maritime supply routes. The USS Maddox was deployed to the area as part of these operations. On the night of July 30-31, 1964, South Vietnamese commandos launched an OPLAN 34A raid against Hon Me Island, targeting North Vietnamese radar and military installations. The North Vietnamese, believing the USS Maddox to be involved, dispatched patrol boats in pursuit of the raiders. While the Maddox withdrew, its crew was reportedly unaware of the raid, setting the stage for escalating tensions.
On August 2, after returning to the area, the Maddox intercepted North Vietnamese communications indicating a potential attack. At 2:40 PM, three North Vietnamese patrol boats approached. When they came within 10,000 yards, Captain John J. Herrick ordered his crew to fire warning shots. The lead vessel responded by launching a torpedo. The Maddox returned fire, damaging all three enemy boats. Four F-8 Crusader fighter jets from the USS Ticonderoga were called in and heavily damaged the patrol boats. Following this skirmish, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the USS Turner Joy (DD-951) to join the Maddox in the Gulf as a show of force. That same night, South Vietnamese forces carried out another OPLAN 34A raid, further escalating tensions.
On the morning of August 4, U.S. intelligence intercepted reports suggesting that North Vietnamese forces were planning an offensive in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, unlike the clear weather during the August 2 engagement, this night brought thunderstorms and six-foot waves, creating poor visibility and radar interference.
At 8:40 PM, the Maddox reported tracking unidentified vessels approaching from multiple directions. Over the next three hours, the two U.S. destroyers, operating more than 100 miles from the North Vietnamese coast, engaged in what they believed was a prolonged battle. Reports included:
Multiple enemy boats approaching at high speed
Sightings of torpedo wakes, cockpit lights, and searchlight beams
Over 20 suspected torpedo attacks
Heavy gunfire from both U.S. destroyers
By the end of the engagement, the Maddox and Turner Joy had fired nearly 250 shells and several depth charges, despite having no clear visual confirmation of enemy boats.
Navy Commander James Stockdale, flying overhead, later disputed the engagement, stating: "Our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there. There was nothing there but black water and American firepower."
Captain Herrick, commanding the destroyers, also began to have doubts. At 1:27 AM on August 5, he sent a high-priority message to Washington, admitting that freak weather, radar interference, and overzealous sonar operators had likely caused false readings. He concluded: "No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action is taken."
However, this cautionary message was largely ignored. That same day, President Johnson addressed the American public, citing the August 4 "attack" as an act of aggression. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was swiftly passed by Congress, granting Johnson broad military authority in Vietnam.
Historians have long suspected that the second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin never occurred and that the resolution was based on faulty evidence. But no declassified information had suggested that McNamara, Johnson, or anyone else in the decision-making process had intentionally misinterpreted the intelligence concerning the 4 August incident. More than 40 years after the events, that all changed with the release of the nearly 200 documents related to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and transcripts from the Johnson Library.
In 2005, the National Security Agency (NSA) declassified key documents confirming these suspicions. Among the most critical pieces of evidence was a classified study titled "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964" by NSA historian Robert J. Hanyok. The study analyzed SIGINT records from both nights and concluded that while the August 2 attack did occur, the August 4 engagement was a fabrication based on faulty intelligence. Additionally, declassified White House tapes revealed discussions between President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and military officials, exposing their uncertainty about whether the attack had actually happened. A phone call between McNamara and Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp recorded McNamara asking, "Was there a possibility that there had been no attack?" Sharp admitted there was a "slight possibility," citing poor sonar readings and radar echoes.
One of the most damning pieces of evidence was a North Vietnamese battle report that had been misinterpreted as confirmation of an attack. In reality, the report referred to the August 2 incident, but had been mistakenly transmitted later, fueling U.S. suspicions of a second engagement. Despite these revelations, Johnson and McNamara proceeded with airstrikes and used the incident to justify further military escalation. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution ultimately paved the way for the full-scale U.S. involvement in Vietnam, a war that would last over a decade and claim more than 58,000 American lives.
President Lyndon B. Johnson himself expressed doubts about the events of August 4 in the Gulf of Tonkin. Days after Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, he reportedly remarked, "Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish."
The omission of critical evidence by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara raises questions about accountability. While the Vietnam conflict may have escalated regardless, given the political and military landscape at the time, the U.S. retaliatory strike on August 5 marked a significant turning point. It was the first direct military action against North Vietnam and represented the most serious escalation up to that point. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Congress passed with little opposition, was framed as a justified response to what were presented as deliberate and unprovoked attacks on U.S. naval vessels. In reality, McNamara's selective presentation of intelligence prevented lawmakers from exercising the civilian oversight essential to the nation's system of checks and balances.
Some historians argue that the Johnson administration deliberately misled the public. In his 1997 book Dereliction of Duty, Army Colonel H.R. McMaster contends that Johnson and McNamara manipulated reports of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for political gain. According to McMaster, they used questionable intelligence to justify military escalation, aiming to bolster Johnson’s re-election bid and counter Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater’s claims that Johnson was weak on foreign policy.
McNamara, for his part, never publicly admitted to any wrongdoing. In his 2003 documentary The Fog of War, he remained unapologetic and even appeared to acknowledge his strategic use of deception, stating: "I learned early on never to answer the question that is asked of you. Answer the question that you wish had been asked of you. And quite frankly, I follow that rule. It's a very good rule."
The Gulf of Tonkin incident exhibits several characteristics of a false flag strategy, particularly in how the U.S. government deliberately withheld crucial information from the public. This cover-up created a specific narrative that would go unchallenged for decades, only to be contradicted by later revelations. The incident has since become a key example for recognizing false flag tactics in modern times.
The public’s understanding of such events has evolved, particularly as investigative journalists and independent organizations often face significant barriers to accessing classified information that could clarify the true origins of an event. In today’s digital age, governments and other actors can manipulate social media and propaganda to distort facts and shape public perception, clouding the truth.
Moreover, people tend to gravitate toward information that aligns with their existing beliefs, making them more susceptible to accepting conspiracy theories about false flag operations, even when the evidence is weak or inconclusive. This tendency highlights the importance of critical thinking in evaluating complex geopolitical events and the narratives surrounding them.