Indonesia’s Occupation of West Timor: Repress, Resupress, and Reform
Fall of Soeharto and the Push for Reform
On May 21, 1998, President Soeharto resigned from office, marking a turning point in the Republic of Indonesia’s political history. Although his departure did not dismantle Pancasila (Indonesia’s foundational ideology rooted in five principles derived from Sanskrit words Panca and Sila) his exit awakened the public to the potential for reform and change.
The fall of the authoritarian New Order state was turbulent. While democratic reforms were initiated, their influence was uneven across public policy sectors, highlighting a persistent imbalance in Indonesia’s center-periphery dynamics. In particular, the region of West Timor emerged as a focal point for this evolving tension. Shortly after Soeharto stepped down, widespread unrest broke out, culminating in the May riots in Jakarta. Students occupied the People’s Consultative Assembly to protest the political status quo, marking the continuation of a crisis that had begun with the 1997 Asian financial collapse.
In response to demands for reform, Soeharto’s successor, B.J. Habibie, pledged to democratize Indonesia. He announced free and fair elections for 1999 and promised to abolish restrictive press laws.
Referendum in East Timor: Violence and Uncertainty
The situation grew increasingly volatile in 1999, when Indonesia’s interim government agreed to a referendum on East Timor’s future. In the following months, reports of violence, abductions, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses surged across the region. Thousands of displaced people were cut off from essential resources like food, water, and medicine. UN observers confirmed that the Indonesian military continued to support, train, and arm militias aiming to suppress the independence movement.
This cast serious doubt on the feasibility of a fair referendum. The 24-year history of Indonesian rule in East Timor raised pressing questions: Was the invasion a geopolitical move to prevent instability, an imperial expansion by a rising power, or an act of genocide? These interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Also under scrutiny was the role of world powers such as Australia whether they were passively negligent or actively complicit in human rights violations.
An assessment of Indonesia's decentralization effort across thirteen districts in ten provinces found broad agreement that the 1999–2004 local assemblies were the most legitimate since the 1955 election. These assemblies were seen as more democratic and accountable than ever. However, significant challenges remained. These were categorized under confusion in implementation, corruption, and heightened expectations in the regions.
Decentralization: Confusion, Corruption, and Expectations
Confusion in Implementation
Significant confusion surrounded the execution of regional autonomy. Local officials often viewed themselves as subordinate only to Jakarta, ignoring provincial governments altogether. While Law No. 25/1999 emphasized fiscal decentralization, many local administrations unlawfully imposed their own taxes, counter to the law’s intent. Additionally, contradictory legislative language led to confusion over jurisdictional responsibilities, and infrastructure transfers from central to local governments had already stalled. Many regional leaders lacked education and experience, weakening democratic institutions further.
Corruption in Local Governance
Money politics remained widespread. Although local administrations were eager to collect taxes, analysts found that this did not result in improved services. Corruption was also evident in the redeployment of civil servants; thousands of employees could not be accounted for after being transferred to local offices.
Expectations of Opportunity
Two major expectations emerged. First, locals anticipated preferential treatment in government hiring, often at the expense of experienced central government personnel. Second, there was a widespread belief that autonomy was irreversible, despite the challenges of devolution.
Allegations of Genocide and International Complicity
Global attention on East Timor rekindled allegations of genocide during Indonesian rule. Though not yet adjudicated in an international court, these claims often featured in scholarly and journalistic works gain traction as East Timor moves closer to full independence. A formal genocide charge would carry significant implications for Indonesian leaders and the international community, including Australia, which has faced repeated accusations of complicity. Evidence of genocide remains preliminary, relying on eyewitness testimonies, investigative journalism, academic work, and accounts from former officials and independence leaders. Rather than assessing these claims legally, this report explores their theoretical underpinnings through the lens of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide.
Under Article II, genocide includes acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. Mass killings, systematic rapes, torture, and indiscriminate bombings in East Timor appear to meet these criteria. The estimated 200,000 deaths roughly one-third of East Timor’s population at the time cannot be explained solely by armed conflict. With Indonesian military deaths estimated at around 2,000 out of 15,000–30,000 troops, the civilian toll stands starkly disproportionate.
The Indonesian military employed collective punishment tactics, bombing villages, poisoning water sources, and forcibly relocating populations. By 1979, 15 guarded camps held over 300,000 displaced individuals, where starvation and forced labor were common. Later, these camps were converted into "resettlement villages" that disrupted traditional clan structures and subjected residents to constant surveillance. One infamous strategy, the “fence of legs,” forced 80,000 civilians to act as human shields for advancing troops. Many died from exhaustion, starvation, or were killed in the crossfire. During this time, agriculture was decimated, and widespread famine ensued.
The International Role: Realpolitik Over Rights
By the 1990s, Indonesian brutality became increasingly visible, particularly after the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre on November 12, 1991. Over 250 unarmed mourners were gunned down by Indonesian troops. British journalist Max Stahl captured the massacre on film, documenting what many have called a premeditated atrocity. Reports emerged that wounded survivors were later executed in hospitals.
This massacre exemplified the systemic repression characterizing Indonesia's rule. Cultural and economic suppression intensified through policies like “Indonesianization” and transmigration. By 1992, approximately 100,000 Indonesians lived in East Timor. Land reforms favored pro-Indonesian settlers and marginalized indigenous people, who were largely excluded from economic participation. P.T. Denok, a company tied to military elites, came to dominate the local economy, especially the coffee trade. Indigenous enterprise and agriculture were undermined by reliance on Indonesian imports. World powers, especially Australia, are repeatedly implicated in supporting Indonesia’s occupation. In 1975, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Soeharto just before the invasion. Western nations continued to supply arms, including British-made Broncos used in bombing campaigns. Despite early UN condemnation, the Security Council blocked effective action.
Australia’s stance has been particularly contentious. Then-Prime Minister Gough Whitlam reportedly considered East Timor’s independence unviable. Both Labor and Conservative Australian governments subsequently recognized Indonesia’s annexation. Canberra pursued economic and military cooperation, culminating in the controversial Timor Gap Treaty for oil exploitation struck without consultation with East Timor or Portugal, the recognized administrative authority.
After Soeharto: A Reckoning for the Past
Soeharto's fall opened the floodgates for criticism of his regime. Allegations of corruption, nepotism, and human rights abuses have surged. These charges echo the mass violence of the mid-1960s, when hundreds of thousands were killed under the pretext of purging communists.
Western support for Soeharto, both during his initial rise and throughout the East Timor occupation, reflected Cold War calculations. The regime was viewed as a bulwark against communism, especially in the wake of the Vietnam War. Indonesia’s strategic importance to the West overshadowed East Timor’s quest for independence. In this geopolitical context, the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was deemed the "neatest" solution. Once committed to this policy, the West was reluctant to criticize Soeharto’s actions too forcefully.
Australia, in particular, deepened its ties with Jakarta and capitalized on the situation economically and militarily. This approach excluded the East Timorese and Portugal, even as international legal and moral questions mounted.