China Will Not Wait to Act Like Russia Did — And Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

U.S. President Donald Trump has opened another front in the ongoing global conflict that pits American efforts to preserve its hegemony against the rising influence of the Global South. This time, it takes the form of a full-scale trade war with China.

For over 15 years, the U.S. has sought to pivot toward Asia in order to confront China's rise. However, persistent entanglements in the Middle East and Europe have hindered this strategic shift. Whether or not it was Trump’s explicit intention when he announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs on April 2, the move quickly evolved into a broader geopolitical initiative. As with U.S. policies toward Russia, Iran, and North Korea, this latest maneuver appears aimed at long-term regime change.

This economic escalation is unfolding alongside a military buildup in the region. The U.S. has deployed Typhon missile systems to the Philippines—capable of reaching all of mainland China—as well as NMESIS anti-ship missile systems. Both Taiwan and the Philippines are emerging as potential staging grounds for a U.S.-backed and directed conflict, much like Ukraine became in Eastern Europe.

Although a war in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait may currently seem unlikely, history cautions otherwise. Few believed Russia would initiate a military operation in Ukraine—yet it did. And unlike Russia, China is unlikely to exercise prolonged restraint.

China and Russia: Not the Same

From a Western-centric perspective, China and Russia—and their leaders, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin—are often viewed as interchangeable. This is a dangerous misreading. The two nations have distinct interests, governing models, and strategic cultures.

Since 2014, Russia has shown notable restraint—a posture often mistaken in the West for weakness. During the Ukraine crisis sparked by the Western-backed coup in Kiev, many of Putin’s advisors urged immediate intervention. Instead, Putin opted for diplomacy, resulting in the Minsk I and II agreements. These deals prevented the Ukrainian military from being overrun by Donbas militias but also gave Ukraine time to rearm with Western support. By 2021, Ukraine was well-prepared for conflict with Russia.

In retrospect, Putin acknowledged in 2023 that waiting until the last moment to launch the "Special Military Operation" was a miscalculation. The initial limited force deployment failed to secure a quick resolution.

China, by contrast, has been methodically preparing for a potential conflict—both militarily and economically—for several years. After Trump imposed initial 20% tariffs in March, Beijing responded with 10–15% tariffs on U.S. agricultural products. The Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., posted on X (formerly Twitter):

“If war is what the U.S. wants—be it a tariff war, a trade war, or any other type of war—we're ready to fight till the end.”

This tone is markedly more confrontational than official Russian government statements throughout the Ukraine conflict, which have been comparatively restrained.

When then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022—widely viewed as a de facto end to the "One China Policy"—Beijing responded with military drills simulating a blockade of the island. These exercises have since become routine. In early April, China conducted additional live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, following a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who reiterated plans to expand U.S. military presence and integrate command structures in Japan and the Philippines.

China's swift tit-for-tat responses to Trump’s tariffs, without calls for de-escalation or negotiation, further illustrate a strategic posture unlike Russia’s.

Crossing China’s Red Lines

The Pacific theater is far more volatile than commonly assumed—and escalation could happen rapidly. Beijing has clearly communicated its red lines, chief among them any declaration of independence by Taiwan or actions consistent with sovereign statehood.

While certain ambiguous actions might be tolerated, China will not accept Taiwan becoming an armed forward base against the mainland. In the Ukrainian case, it wasn’t until late 2021 that the U.S. initiated a full military build-up in the Donbas region. Within six months, Russia responded with force.

A similar timeline is unlikely in the Taiwan scenario. A formal Taiwanese move toward independence—an action that would require tacit U.S. approval—would likely trigger a Chinese response within weeks, not months.

Unlike Russia, which functions primarily as a regional power with limited global projection, China possesses full-spectrum superpower capabilities.

Will Taiwan Become the Next Ukraine?

While some observers anticipate Taiwan serving a similar role to Ukraine in U.S. global strategy, the comparison does not hold beyond surface-level utility.

Ukraine, both before and after 2014, remained underdeveloped, with widespread poverty and systemic issues. These conditions contributed to the rise of nationalist ideologies and resentment toward Russia. Taiwan, on the other hand, is a prosperous, developed economy with a high standard of living. Anti-China sentiment is far less prevalent than anti-Russian sentiment was in Ukraine.

According to a 2024 poll by Taiwan’s Central News Agency, over 80% of residents support maintaining the “status quo”—de facto independence without a formal declaration that would provoke a war with China.

Taiwan is also geographically vulnerable. Unlike Ukraine, it cannot rely on overland support from neighboring allies. As an island, any conflict would likely begin with a Chinese blockade and airspace denial. In such a scenario, it would be up to the U.S. military—not Taiwan’s—to break the siege, requiring operations launched thousands of miles away and exposing American forces to advanced Chinese missile and submarine threats.

Sooner Than Expected

One factor restraining Russia from deeper engagement with countries like North Korea and Iran was the threat of Western sanctions. But the sweeping sanctions imposed on Moscow in 2022 effectively removed that disincentive. Russia has since expanded its ties with previously isolated states.

China may now be reaching a similar turning point. Its once-critical economic ties with the U.S. have frayed significantly. With diminished incentives for caution, Beijing may feel emboldened to act.

The Trump administration's current approach toward China mirrors its earlier strategy toward Russia—a multifaceted campaign that includes economic pressure, regional militarization, and political containment. Though direct conflict has not yet erupted, the conditions are ripe, and the spark could ignite at any moment.

Russia “did nothing” in Ukraine—until it did. Iran “did nothing” until it launched Operation True Promise 2. China may not be “doing anything” now. But that won’t be the case if and when it decides to act.