Egypt and Israel: A Hypothetical War Between Arch Enemies
In recent weeks, the far-right media in Israel, alongside the Israeli government, has been alluding to the inevitability of a military clash with Egypt, suggesting that Israel must prepare for it, or even launch a first strike.
But how would such a conflict actually unfold? This topic has been debated by military strategists, planners, and even ordinary citizens of both countries for nearly half a century. However, the discussion is often clouded by nationalist bias from both sides. This article aims to provide a realistic analysis of what a war—one that would likely be among the most destructive in the Middle East in the 21st century—might look like.
The War at the Seas
Both states are sea-faring nations. Due to its extensive coastline, Egypt maintains a large navy out of necessity. In fact, Egyptian naval assets rank among the largest in the world. However, size alone does not guarantee power projection. Egypt can comfortably project its naval power in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, which, for the purposes of this analysis, is sufficient.
The most critical Egyptian naval assets for challenging Israeli shipping would be its submarines and missile boats. Historically, Egypt was the first nation to achieve a surface ship-to-ship missile kill, sinking the INS Eilat. Even during the 1973 war, attacks on merchant shipping were common, with both sides engaging in missile strikes against foreign vessels. Naval blockades played a significant role in past conflicts.
Egypt operates four German-made Type 209 submarines, which are considered high-quality diesel-electric attack submarines. While it also has older, upgraded Romeo-class submarines, the Type 209s pose a much greater threat. Israel also operates these same Type 209 submarines. Beyond submarines, Egypt has a considerable arsenal of land-to-ship and ship-to-ship missiles, capable of covering both Israel’s Mediterranean and Red Sea coastlines. Given these capabilities, most civilian shipping to Israel would likely cease due to the risk of being targeted.
While Israel could theoretically threaten Egypt’s Mediterranean coastline (The Israeli naval assets that are a real threat to Egypt are only 2 things - its submarine fleet and missile boats, and combined they number no more than twenty), its small navy and limited anti-ship missile stockpiles mean it would not pose the same level of threat to Egyptian maritime trade as Egypt would to Israel, and it is unlikely that Israel would be able to threaten naval shipping to Egypt through the Red Sea.
In terms of logistics, Egypt's naval industry has expanded significantly over the past decade, with the capability to produce its own corvettes and armaments. This growing self-sufficiency ensures a steady supply of most weapon platforms. Given these advancements, it is unlikely that the navy would be the first branch of either country to suffer from ammunition shortages or logistical constraints in a prolonged conflict.
The War in the Air
While the Egyptian Air Force has a quantitative edge over the Israeli one, the same cannot be said for its quality in terms of aircraft alone. The Egyptian Air Force operates a large fleet of Dassault Rafales, MiG-29s, and F-16s. However, the F-16 fleet is aging and would be best relegated to roles beyond air combat, as only the MiGs and Rafales possess beyond-visual-range (BVR) capability. The Israeli Air Force, on the other hand, remains one of the deadliest branches of the IDF, a fact acknowledged 60 years ago and still true today, which has historically forced Arab states to focus on air defense systems instead. A notable example of the effectiveness of this strategy was the 1973 war, during which over 30 Israeli aircraft were shot down on the first day alone. This demonstrated that a well-integrated and developed air defense system could still inflict heavy losses on Israeli airpower. By the end of the war, nearly all Israeli hunter-killer squadrons had suffered massive casualties, with up to 80% of their pilots wounded, killed, or missing in action in some instances.
However, Israeli air assets are no joke either. All Israeli combat aircraft are technologically superior, equipped with BVR capability, and have demonstrated exceptional accuracy in air-to-ground strikes, as seen in recent operations in Syria and Lebanon. The F-15, F-16, and F-35 fleets would be among Israel's most critical assets in such a conflict.
That being said, history has shown that an attritional air war against Israel is not only feasible but has precedent. In a hypothetical scenario where two Israeli combat aircraft are lost per day—a conservative estimate given that during the 1973 war, Israel lost an average of five planes daily—it would take approximately five months to eliminate the entire combat fleet and just two months for Israel to lose half of its air power. This projection underscores the potential vulnerability of Israeli air superiority in a prolonged conflict.
However, Israeli electronic warfare assets today are far more advanced and numerous than they were fifty years ago. Accurately judging the outcome of any aerial engagement would be nearly impossible, as modern conflicts rely heavily on electronic countermeasures, cyber warfare, and real-time intelligence—factors that can significantly alter the effectiveness of air defense systems.
The Egyptian Air Defense branch, historically, has been credited with shooting down the highest number of Israeli aviation assets throughout the Arab-Israeli wars. This earned Egypt the reputation of having one of the most well-developed air defense networks among the Arab countries. In recent years, Egypt has made significant investments in both Russian and European air defense technologies, acquiring a wide array of missile systems, advanced radar platforms, and integrated command structures.
Simply put—there can never be a repeat of the 1967 surprise. Nor will Egypt's airspace be a pushover again. The modernization of its defensive infrastructure reflects both strategic awareness and a long-standing institutional memory of past conflicts.
Commanders and aviators are not deluded to the fact that the war in the air would be one of the most tense and mentally-draining areas in the war, the Israeli air force due to its small size would feel the pain of losing assets, while the Egyptian one has a higher pain tolerance, airframes can not be constructed out of thin air instantly - although Egypt has one of the largest aircraft workshops in Africa and the Middle East, its expertise is primarily focused on maintenance and the production of aircraft parts rather than full-scale aircraft manufacturing, although it can produce drones and other types of UAVs.
It is unlikely that there would be massive aerial dogfights between fighter planes; any such engagements would primarily take place at BVR range. Egypt would rely on its extensive air defense systems and missile forces to degrade the operational capacity of the Israeli Air Force. While fighter jets may maneuver in the skies, their bases remain fixed targets, making them vulnerable to missile strikes. Moreover, most modern air combat kills—such as those seen in the Ukraine war—have come from air defense systems rather than direct aircraft-on-aircraft engagements.
Egypt also operates one of the largest attack helicopter fleets in the world - Ka-52s and Apaches - although how they would be utilized in case of a full scale war is unclear, if these assets manage to make their way into Israel proper or against an Israeli armored thrust into Sinai and utilize the tactics used by the Russian VKS helicopter pilots in the Ukraine war, the results would be disastrous for Israeli armored elements.
Again, Israel suffers from a lack of large stockpiles of missiles and bombs. The geographical dispersion of Egyptian air bases, combined with the strength of its air defense systems, would make targeting and destroying these bases significantly more challenging than similar operations in Syria. Meanwhile, Israel, being a small and densely clustered state, has a limited number of airbases, making them more vulnerable to missile and air strikes.
The War on the Ground
Seamen and aviators are of no use if their ports and airbases are overrun, which is why, although every front carries its own weight, the war on the ground would ultimately decide the outcome between the two states.
The size of the Egyptian Army is simply colossal, surpassing that of many European nations combined. The Third Field Army alone possesses more tanks than the United Kingdom, France, and Germany combined—and these are not outdated Soviet relics, either.
Over the past 20 years, the expansion of Egypt’s military-industrial complex has ensured self-sufficiency in small arms, rocket forces, and crew-operated infantry weapons such as ATGMs. Egyptian industry also supports the production of personal equipment, communications gear, and protective gear, ensuring that troops are well-equipped. Additionally, Egypt's defense industry is capable of producing and maintaining vehicles, including tanks. While the future of the M1 Abrams production facility in the event of a cessation of U.S. aid remains uncertain, Egypt has reportedly stockpiled a significant number of spare parts and developed the technical expertise needed to maintain its Abrams fleet independently.
On the Israeli side, while the Merkava is an exceptional tank for counterinsurgency and urban warfare, its performance against modern main battle tanks (at least, non-Soviet export model tanks - it is still not even confirmed if Merkavas ever faced Syrian T-72s in Lebanon) in direct engagements remains untested—and in a close-range armored clash, the outcome may not be in Israel’s favor.
How the war on the ground would go is anybody's best guess, but there are some common facts that both sides are aware of and will try to avoid falling into their traps if possible. For one, northern Sinai is almost entirely flat desert, and therefore the aggressor will face the issue of being exposed to all sorts of traps from the air. Armored columns in flat desert lands usually do not have a great record of surviving to the end of their journey.
Therefore, there are only two possible directions the land battle could take—either Egypt will remain close to the Suez Canal and Al-Arish, gradually wearing down Israeli assets (if they are aggressive), or battles will extend into Gaza and the Israeli interior. The latter scenario would be exceptionally bloody and difficult, with urban combat in kibbutzim and Israeli cities potentially rivaling some of the fiercest battles seen in Ukraine. There is no realistic scenario in which Israel would degrade the operational capacity of the Egyptian army to the extent that it could cross into mainland Egypt. As a result, all fighting would be confined to either the Sinai or the Israeli interior. More than 50 years have passed, and while time has not stood still, lessons have been learned and mistakes corrected.
The Israeli economy will not survive a war of such scale. The Israeli economy barely survived a small-scale war in 1973—so what would happen in a full-scale war today? To provide some context, here are key figures from both Egyptian intelligence records and Israeli post-war assessments regarding the economic impact on Israel after the Yom Kippur War:
75% of Israelis fit for military service were recalled into state service. Calling up three-quarters of your workforce is a disastrous economic indicator.
The Israeli consumer economy collapsed. Supply chains were severely disrupted, oil prices increased by 50%, and electricity costs nearly doubled.
Political instability followed. The Israeli government collapsed after the war, and deep political distrust between factions emerged.
Now, take these historical factors from 50 years ago, triple their scale, and you may begin to grasp the extent of the economic devastation Israel would face in a modern full-scale war.
WMDs?
Nobody knows who will push the first button, but both states would not survive the use of weapons of mass destruction.
While Israel is theorized to possess nuclear warheads, Egypt, in turn, has a stockpiled and extensive biological and chemical weapons program. In fact, Egypt is one of only two countries capable of constructing such weapons that have refused to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention—the other being North Korea.
Israel claims to have an extensive shelter system in place for its residents, but in the history of the world, such a system has never been tested under live conditions. Mass bombardment of civilian and military areas with biological agents and chemical weapons has never occurred—and hopefully never will. Hezbollah rockets and a few SCUDs are not exactly proof of being NBC-certified. Both governments are aware of this and are unlikely to be reckless enough to find out.
Foreign Support
The U.S. will most likely not get involved militarily on Israel’s side. Both Israel and Egypt are considered major non-NATO allies of the United States, and Washington’s stance would likely mirror its position during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus—favoring indirect involvement and negotiations.
Given that this would be an active warzone, The U.S. will not offer direct logistical support to Israel, considering the potential risk of an Egyptian blockade, but it would most likely provide intelligence information. Operation Nickel Grass was only possible due to:
Strong European support at the time—something that, given current Euro-American relations, may not be possible again.
Egypt’s alignment with the "Eastern" camp during the Cold War, which meant the U.S. faced no major domestic or lobby disputes in aiding Israel.
However, further discussion on this topic would be speculative, as both nations would undoubtedly leverage their alliances and networks, potentially escalating a bilateral conflict into a regional war. For the purposes of this article, the focus remains solely on a direct military clash between the two powers within the context of the international economy and regional situation - money is what fuels nations through wars, and the defacto situation on the ground is what decides how the playing field would be, to discount either would be illiterate in a hypothetical war.
The Egyptian economy would undoubtedly suffer as well, especially considering that a large-scale war requires substantial resources and a heavy toll on the civilian economy. However, Egypt's government has a history of controlling and subsidizing key industries, as well as seizing whatever it needs for the war effort. This level of state control can act as a stabilizing factor in times of economic strain.
Economists who have tried to analyze Egypt's war economy often find it difficult to assess, as it operates through a model that is unique and, at times, chaotic. The Egyptian state has the capability to absorb short-term shocks by effectively managing resources and directing production for military needs. However, this approach isn't without its long-term costs—especially if it leads to more systemic inefficiencies and lack of innovation in the civilian sectors.
While both economies would be badly impacted by the war, Israel's economy would likely collapse first. Given its small size, the heavy reliance on high-tech industries, and its limited strategic depth, a prolonged conflict would drain resources and cause significant disruption, especially in the context of the supply chain, energy, and manpower shortages. In contrast, Egypt, with its larger landmass, natural resources, and state-controlled economy, may be better positioned to manage short-term wartime demands.
That said, Egypt’s leadership may resort to a nuclear option, by centralizing power even more, controlling every sector of the economy, and placing tighter restrictions on the population. This would come with disastrous long-term effects on growth, stability, and international relations.
But the true disaster would be losing the war, which will mean a military defeat, political collapse of the leadership, and loss of sovereignty.
Conclusion
Nobody can predict the results of conflicts accurately, but we can say one thing for sure:
Hundreds of thousands of women will be widowed, hundreds of thousands of children would become fatherless, and hundreds of thousands more would perish on the sands and in the cities. Wealth will be overturned, and money will burn.
Peace was always in the interest of the Egyptian people—the first peace treaty in the world was signed by Egyptians. However, it is obvious that, sadly, due to the state of affairs of man, men at arms would always be required, doubly so when you have Israel as a neighbor. Israeli ministers are bloodthirsty warmongers who are not educated in their own history - Ben Gvir and Smotrich have said, word for word, that they want war in the West Bank and Gaza. Peace was given as an option for a hope of a better tomorrow, but the war in Gaza has dashed any semblance of hope. However, it is a requirement and an obligation of God to offer the olive branch before the sword, and the olive branch was slapped out of the hands, which only leaves the sword.
We can only hope that straight-headed diplomats, politicians, and the like, will put an end to the massacres and genocides occurring in our region, but it seems to be lacking, and that leaves men of our profession to try and deal with the consequences.