The 2022 Uprising in Kazakhstan: A Failed Spark with Global Implications

The 2022 riots in Kazakhstan, which began on January 2nd and lasted less than two weeks, have received limited international attention. This is partly because they ended quickly, were overshadowed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a month later and ultimately failed to achieve any political transformation.

While the protests reflected genuine grievances among Kazakh citizens, they were either a smokescreen or were hijacked by external actors whose aims had less to do with Kazakhstan and more to do with destabilizing Russia and China.

The nine days of unrest in Kazakhstan could have dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape. In hindsight, their failure served as a harbinger of events that would unfold shortly thereafter.

Why Kazakhstan Matters

Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic sharing a 7,600-kilometer (4,722-mile) border with Russia, is seen by many geopolitical strategists—particularly among American neoconservatives—as a strategic prize. Its vast border stretches from the outskirts of Volgograd through the Volga region and across Siberia.

The country also borders China’s Xinjiang region, a flashpoint that has drawn considerable Western scrutiny over allegations of human rights abuses—claims that remain unproven.

Kazakhstan is resource-rich, boasting significant reserves of oil, gas, and uranium. Since the 1990s, Western energy companies have maintained a strong presence there, further elevating the country’s strategic importance.

Prelude to the Uprising

Kazakhstan’s historical capital was Almaty. However, in 1997, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev relocated the capital more than 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) north to Astana. Despite the move, the political power base of Kazakhstan has largely remained in the southern region, where it has traditionally been centered.

Efforts to destabilize Kazakhstan likely accelerated after the failure of a 2020 color revolution in Belarus. The attempted overthrow of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko faltered, largely due to Russian support.

When it became clear by 2021 that a war in Ukraine was being provoked, the U.S. and its European allies likely sought to stretch Russia’s capabilities by opening another front—this time on its southern and eastern doorstep.

The Riots

The protests began on January 2nd in the city of Zhanaozen, located in the Mangystau Region, in response to rising gas prices. Within days, demonstrations spread nationwide. By January 4th, violent clashes between protesters and police had broken out.

Eyewitness accounts from the ground indicate that armed groups emerged behind the protesters and initiated confrontations with police forces

Government buildings were stormed and overrun. Armed groups engaged in gunfights with security forces. Police armories were looted, and weapons were distributed among rioters. For a moment, the Kazakh government appeared to be teetering on the edge.

The largest and most violent unrest occurred in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city and historical center of power. Located far from the official government seat in Astana, Almaty presented a strategic location where a rival government could potentially be declared and rapidly organized.

Videos began to emerge of various individuals and other proclaimed groups claiming to be forming new provincial governments.

On January 5th, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested military support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a defense alliance comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

CSTO troops arrived the next day, securing airports, government buildings, and other strategic sites, while Kazakh forces swiftly and violently suppressed the unrest.

By January 11th, Tokayev announced that order had been restored. Over 9,000 people were arrested. At least 238 civilians were killed, along with 19 members of the security forces—including two police officers reportedly found beheaded.

Both Tokayev and Russian President Vladimir Putin attributed the violence to “external actors.”

Was It Coordinated?

Beyond the speed and coordination of the armed groups, the timing of the unrest suggests careful planning.

Consider the historical context: the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing coincided with the Western supported Georgian governments invasion of South Ossetia, in invasion occurring the day before the opening ceremony, which triggered the five-day Russo-Georgian War. In 2014, as the Sochi Winter Olympics were underway, Ukraine's Euromaidan movement peaked, culminating in the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and the subsequent reunification of Crimea with Russia.

Western strategists may assume that major global sporting events distract authoritarian regimes or make them hesitant to respond forcefully, fearing international condemnation. These moments of global focus have been used to accuse Russia of acting aggressively during times of supposed peace.

In February 2022, the Winter Olympics once again took place in Beijing—just weeks after the Kazakh unrest and days before Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine. Once might be a coincidence. Twice raises eyebrows. Three times form a pattern.

What If It Had Succeeded?

Unlike in Ukraine in 2014, Russia responded without hesitation. It immediately backed the Tokayev government, something it failed to do with Yanukovych in time.

Had Kazakhstan descended into chaos, or its government been overthrown, Russia would have faced a strategic crisis on its southern border just as it was preparing to move into Ukraine.

With nearly three million ethnic Russians living primarily in northern Kazakhstan, the Kremlin would have faced pressure to intervene—whether to protect these populations or to secure its frontier.

China would not have been immune either. Kazakhstan borders its sensitive Xinjiang region, and a destabilized Kazakhstan could have become a conduit for radicalized fighters seeking to sow chaos inside China.

The collapse of Kazakhstan—the largest country in Central Asia—would have had ripple effects throughout the region, like how the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq eventually destabilized the entire Middle East.

This is not to dismiss or discredit the real grievances held by many Kazakhs. But the failure of the insurrection may have saved Central Asia—and possibly the broader multipolar order—from a much larger conflict.