In 2011, an upheaval of immense magnitude took place—the people took to the streets.
However, as always, it is essential to examine the origins of such events. Revolutions do not happen spontaneously; people do not simply wake up one day and collectively decide to overthrow a government. To understand Egypt’s future, we must first understand the foundations of its political system.
In 1952, a revolution overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. At the time, Egypt was a kingdom, but army officers, backed by popular support, seized control and later legitimized their rule. From 1952 until 1970 (after Mohammed Naguib was sidelined), the country was governed as a one-party state under a single leader—Gamal Abdel Nasser. After Nasser’s death in 1970, Anwar Sadat took over.
Sadat significantly expanded Egypt’s parliamentary life, liberalized the economy, and introduced a multi-party system. The political scene became notably active—student protests erupted against Sadat, and the Muslim Brotherhood officially established its political presence throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, by the 2000s, corruption had become deeply entrenched, with most parliamentary deputies either compromised by economic oligarchs or aligned with religious fundamentalists.
In the early 2000s, public discontent against then-President Mubarak reached an all-time high, culminating in protests in 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008. These demonstrations, primarily led by students and workers, were driven by socialist and liberal tendencies, and would pave the way for the 2011 Arab Spring protest.
The Arab Spring arrived, and in Egypt, it lasted just a month—after which Mubarak was no more.
But then, who would take his place?
After the honeymoon period of the revolution, such questions demanded answers. In Egypt, the political landscape was divided into three distinct groups: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Liberals, and the Armed Forces. Following the 2011 revolution, the military, through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), assumed control of the country. While some concessions were made to the demands of the revolution, backroom dealings persisted, as they always had.
A total purge of political factions was not yet on the table. Historically, alliances had been fluid, forming and dissolving depending on circumstances.
For instance, in the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood sided with the Armed Forces against socialist factions during certain strikes, even justifying the executions of socialist leaders. However, by the 1960s, the military turned against the Brotherhood, driving them underground. Under Sadat, they were cautiously allowed back into political life to face off against socialist unions and strikers of the 1970s and 1980s, and their cooperation with Mubarak continued into the 2000s.
Then, in the aftermath of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood leveraged its superior organizational skills and extensive grassroots networks to win the 2012 elections. It was the most contested election in Egypt’s history, with an almost evenly split vote—51% to 49%—leaving the country deeply divided. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood secured control of parliament.
2013 was not a good year for the Muslim Brotherhood. They were widely seen as politically inexperienced, and the inflammatory rhetoric of their supporters and mid-level leaders alienated much of the Egyptian population. In fact, their approach could be described as delusional overconfidence, as a matter of fact, the Qatari and Turkish Foreign Ministers informed Morsi that his agitative policies will eventually lead him to a clash with most of Egyptian society, he did not take the advice. This led to an unlikely coalition of liberals, socialists, Salafists, and the Armed Forces, all united in their goal to remove the Brotherhood from power—a mission that ultimately succeeded.
The political dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood followed soon after. In Egypt, their organized presence has been effectively eradicated, and their supporters now find themselves either imprisoned, in exile, or having abandoned politics altogether.
For 14 years, Sisi has been the president of Egypt. No serious threat to his rule has ever materialized on the ground, and it remains highly unlikely that he will be ousted through protests, revolution, or a coup. He has endured some of the most turbulent periods in the Middle East, facing organizations that have existed for nearly a century. However, he is still just a man, and no leader can remain in power indefinitely. Any threats to his presidency have been systematically neutralized—violent opposition was met with force, political rivals were either co-opted or sidelined, and regional adversaries have since turned into allies.
It is worth noting that Turkish President Erdoğan once publicly declared he would "never meet with the coupist."
Last year, he shook Sisi’s hand.
A striking aspect of Egypt’s political landscape is the absence of a clear successor. Legally speaking, this is Sisi’s final term, and he has not indicated any intention of seeking re-election. If he steps down voluntarily, he could become the first Egyptian president to leave office peacefully while still alive—unlike his predecessors: Nasser, who died of health complications; Sadat, who was assassinated; Morsi, who was overthrown; and Mubarak, who was deposed.
At the same time, recent political and economic concessions have created limited space for maneuvering, allowing for a degree of free speech and lobbying. However, Egypt’s political scene remains largely wiped clean, with no organizations capable of effectively challenging the existing order.
The future may seem uncertain, even bleak. But history has shown that in the most challenging times, new figures emerge. Those with the necessary economic resources—and, optionally, popular backing—will eventually rise to power and claim the presidency.