At the end of World War II and the defeat of the Axis powers, it became evident that a new world order was emerging. The post-war landscape was shaped by negotiations between the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union, laying the foundation for a global system designed to prevent the mistakes of the 1920s and the failures of the League of Nations. As part of this effort, new international organizations were established to promote diplomacy, peace, and cooperation. Among them was the Arab League, an alliance created to unite Arab nations under a shared vision of political and economic collaboration.
In 1944, six countries—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia—signed the Alexandria Protocol, laying the groundwork for a regional alliance. Delegates from other Arab states and communities were also present, and by March 1945, the Arab League was officially established. Unlike pan-Arab movements that envisioned a unified Arab state stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, the Arab League’s primary goals were to promote economic integration and serve as a platform for resolving disputes among its member states.
The sovereignty of Arab states was a central concern for all member governments. The Arab League brought together republics and monarchies, each with divergent political ideologies and governance structures. This ideological divide often led to tensions and conflicts, making cooperation challenging. As a result, these internal divisions hindered the League’s effectiveness, limiting its ability to act as a unified force in regional affairs.
While the Arab League maintained a united stance on the Palestinian issue, internal conflicts among its member states quickly emerged. In 1952, Egypt’s Free Officers Movement overthrew the monarchy, a development that alarmed the monarchical states of Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Their fears were later reinforced when Iraq’s King Faisal II was overthrown and executed in 1958, raising concerns that Egypt’s revolution could inspire similar uprisings in other monarchies.
This ideological divide led to the Arab Cold War, pitting republican regimes—often backed by the Soviet Union and nationalist movements—against monarchies supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. The rivalry saw multiple coup attempts in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which ultimately failed, and a proxy war in Yemen, where Egypt-backed republican forces defeated the monarchy. Additionally, inter-Arab tensions escalated into armed conflict between Algeria and Morocco.
The exhaustion caused by these internal rivalries weakened collective Arab military coordination, contributing to Israel’s swift victory in the 1967 Six-Day War. During this period, the Arab League played only a minor role, as its ability to mediate or unify its members was severely diminished by these deep-seated divisions.
Even so, there was a brief period of Arab coordination against Israel from 1967 to 1973, as the existential threat posed by Israel was acknowledged by both republican and monarchical states. This unity, however, began to unravel after Egypt signed the 1979 Camp David Accords with Israel, leading to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League. While Egypt was readmitted in 1990, the League soon faced another crisis—Iraq’s invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait in the same year.
The Arab League failed to mediate or de-escalate the crisis, forcing Saudi Arabia to turn to the United States to lead the Gulf War coalition against Iraq. This event marked a turning point, as Gulf monarchies increasingly prioritized relations with the Western-led unipolar world order over inter-Arab cooperation. To this day, Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, while Saudi-U.S. military cooperation remains extensive, reflecting the region’s strategic shift toward external alliances rather than intra-Arab unity.
The Arab League’s most tangible accomplishments have been in economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, but its political impact has been minimal despite its 70+ years of existence. Its ineffectiveness is most apparent in its failure to resolve conflicts between Arab states or those involving them. Moreover, even when the League passes resolutions, they are rarely enforced and are often outright ignored by member states—a consequence of the League’s founding structure and voting system, which prioritizes national sovereignty over collective decision-making.
In comparison, other Arab organizations carry more international weight than the Arab League. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for instance, has become a more effective political and economic entity, often engaging with global powers directly rather than operating within the framework of the Arab League. Additionally, while some regional organizations have military alliances (such as NATO’s role in Europe), the Arab League lacks a unified defense mechanism.
The League’s only military interventions have been limited and largely symbolic—such as its small force deployed to suppress protests in Bahrain in 2011. Attempts at military cooperation, like the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, have often had disastrous humanitarian consequences, further diminishing the League’s credibility as a cohesive political or military entity.
At its current pace, the Arab League has fallen short of the dreams of its original founders, and the Arab populace largely views it with disappointment, seeing it as a failed vision of unity and cooperation. While the organization's future may seem bleak, there is still time for reform—a chance to realign with its original mission and become an effective force for regional stability and progress. However, for this to happen, it is not enough for only some leaders to push for change—all Arab heads of state must genuinely commit to revitalizing the League, not for their own political gains, but for the sake of their people and the shared aspirations of the Arab world.