For over a decade, the Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) based in Russia, has been at the center of a legal and strategic debate. Despite its significant role in Russia’s military operations, particularly in Ukraine and Syria, the group had never been formally legalized, until its official integration into the Russian Armed Forces following their rebellion in 2024. This raises a key question: why did the Russian government refrain from officially recognizing the Wagner Group for so long?
Researchers specialized in Warfare Strategies have taken their time to describe the whole concept of private military companies.
According to Sean McFate, an analyst with a Ph.D. who both understands the need for definitions in social science, “PMCs” distinguishes themselves from within a broader group of “private security companies” (PSCs). Based on their functions. Some broader PSCs gather and analyze intelligence, act as bodyguards or guards at physical installations, or are contractors who provide food, housekeeping, and other goods and services to state military forces in the field, though, private security companies are less known to be involved in military disputes, therefore this fact alone has refuted McFate’s effort in describing private military companies. It is also further attempted to be described as “mercenaries”, where it is described by Peter Singer, the Australian Philosopher, as “individuals who fight for employers other than their home state’s government and whose motivation for fighting is economic gain.” Although this seems to be the perfect definition for the Wagner Group, a counter argument was made, mercenaries are completely Independent and only linked to their clients, as to where The Wagner Group is, they’re almost as close as being legitimate state-owned armies.
The next question arises, what has the Wagner Group contributed that created this dilemma?
The Wagner Group first emerged in the public eye during the conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region. However, evidence suggests that its members had begun organizing in Crimea at the onset of the Ukrainian crisis. Initial reports indicated that Wagner operatives were among the so-called “polite people” or “little green men” who played a pivotal role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea. These forces ensured that the takeover was largely bloodless, swiftly neutralizing Ukrainian military positions across the peninsula. Shortly after the annexation, multiple private military companies (PMCs) surfaced in the Donbas region, contributing to its destabilization in a manner that benefited Moscow. Wagner’s activities in Crimea, along with the broader Russian military doctrine emphasizing plausible deniability, suggest that PMCs were employed as auxiliary forces to Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF). This strategy aligns with Russia’s preference for non-attributable military engagements, particularly in politically sensitive operations.
Russian investigative journalist Denis Korotkov has corroborated Wagner’s involvement in Crimea, stating that its operatives were present during the annexation. Korotkov, known for his critical reporting on Wagner’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the Kremlin’s governance, is one of the few Russian voices recognized in Western intelligence circles. At the time of writing, Korotkov faces accusations from the Russian government, including extremism, terrorist affiliations, inciting hatred, high treason, and calls for regime change—charges widely seen as part of Moscow’s crackdown on dissenting journalists. Ukrainian intelligence services (SSU) have also concluded that the “little green men” were, in fact, Wagner operatives.
The exact timeline of Wagner’s establishment in Ukraine remains unclear, but it is evident that it was not the only pro-Russian paramilitary force active in Crimea. Other irregular groups, including Luna, Step, the Night Wolves biker gang, and Yemetskin, contributed to the region’s destabilization. Some of these factions later merged into Wagner’s ranks as the conflict evolved. Wagner’s debut on the global stage was marked by its role in Crimea, where it operated through deception, propaganda, and covert military action. The group’s ability to seize key infrastructure, disrupt Ukrainian communications, and isolate military units indicates a high level of planning, intelligence-gathering, and disciplined operational execution—capabilities that exceed those of an untrained militia.
Wagner’s rapid evolution into an elite paramilitary force strongly suggests state sponsorship, a theory further supported by its access to advanced weaponry and sophisticated tactics. The group’s operational style is characterized by unconventional warfare, strategic ambiguity, and disinformation—aligns with Russia’s broader geopolitical strategy. By employing Wagner in low-intensity conflicts, Moscow maintains the ability to exert influence and pursue expansionist objectives while preserving plausible deniability, allowing it to distance itself from direct military engagement when politically expedient.
The Wagner Group's most well-documented operations occurred during the Syrian Civil War. Initially deployed to eastern Ukraine in 2014, Wagner was later transferred to Syria to support President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime from 2015 to 2018. Various Russian and Western sources confirm that Wagner personnel trained at the Molkino military base, which is also used by Russia’s 10th Special Forces Brigade (GRU). Footage from Molkino indicates that Wagner operatives trained with advanced weaponry, including:
BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launchers
2S19 Msta-S and 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled guns
Tornado-G multiple rocket launchers
Reports suggest that Wagner’s training regimen closely mirrors that of Russia’s special operations forces, including GRU and SOF tactics.
At its peak, Wagner reportedly deployed 2,349 personnel in Syria. Its command structure consisted of:
Upper command: Commander-in-chief and managing director
Middle command: Administrative group (388 personnel), general staff (19 personnel), and control group (36 personnel)
Lower command: Approximately 1,904 operatives
An investigation by Russian media outlet Fontanka revealed that until 2017, Wagner's command and control (C2) structure closely resembled that of the Russian Armed Forces. This allowed Wagner to execute military operations typically reserved for conventional armies. However, by late 2017, Wagner had integrated more deeply with the Syrian military, leading to a shift in its operational independence.
Prior to February 2018 (the destruction of the Wagner Group that opened a new chapter of its history), Wagner's Syrian campaign was divided into three phases:
“Ground Reconnaissance” (September 2015–early 2016): This phase did not involve any major military operations, as it was limited mostly to the original deployment and some initial military encounters with anti-Al-Assad forces
“Baptism by Fire” (April/May–December 2016): Throughout this phase, Wagner mercenaries experienced intensified exchanges of fire as well as their first serious military confrontations. The main operation involving Wagner during this period was the liberation of Palmyra. As such, Wagner Group units suffered their first serious losses: according to Russian sources, 32 were killed and approximately 80 were heavily wounded at this time. On the other hand, the number of Wagner members deployed to Syria may have risen to 1,500–2,000 men. Judging by the available information, Wagner’s Syrian activities during the discussed period primarily boiled down to frontal military attacks (resembling functions typically performed by shock wave troops). Apparently, those missions were meant to demonstrate to the Syrian regime the PMC’s high fighting skills, thereby convincing the government in Damascus to assume part of the financial burden. During this time, the group utilized the best possible (given the circumstances) types of weaponry/munitions and, as far as the majority of recollections go, acted independently from the Syrian Armed Forces and groups loyal to Al-Assad
“Deep Involvement” (January 2017–February 2018): This phase was characterized by the gradual evolution of the functions performed by the Wagner Group as well as its mode of operation. The key transformation, after demonstrating a sufficiently high level of operative skills was reflected in a visible evolution of its tasks from de facto military operations (especially visible during the recapture of Palmyra) to more paramilitary-style missions, primarily concerned with recapturing areas endowed with hydrocarbons, including oil and gas fields near Palmyra (Shaer), Latakia, and Aleppo. Interestingly, as noted by one anonymous Wagner member, “The PMC is not conducting full fledged military battles there (Syria), its functions are primarily concerned with expanding control over zones/areas endowed with oil and natural gas, and their protection. This is what they are paid for… But it is impossible to control an oil field with the militants anti-Al-Assad forces being 500 meters away from you, you will have to drive them away by force.”
Russia’s Position in The Syrian Civil War
The Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria, a longstanding ally of Russia, was coming to grips with the culmination of the Arab Spring. The country was plunged into a civil war that is ongoing to this day between the regime and a plethora of factions ranging from jihadist extremist ISIL to US backed Al-Tanf Rebels. The destabilized nature of a country rich in resources with significant Russian interest was ripe for the plucking to further evolve and solidify the Russian utilization of PMCs in their “New Type War” doctrine. Al-Assad’s Syrian regime is a staunch trading partner for Russia and is a major importer of Russian arms. The collapse of Syria would have dire consequences for the Russian arms industry. Furthermore, with Al-Assad out of the picture, it is reasonable to predict that Russian influence wane as a regime change turn towards a more pro-Western approach as U.S. military presence in the region as it backed anti-regime forces and the Kurds that battled the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. An unfavorable regime change that could result in pro-Western leanings would serve to further isolate Russia geopolitically, going against the Russian resurgence as part of its grand strategy. Wagner Group’s entrance into the conflict allowed Al-Assad to stabilize his lines resulting in the country currently largely under regime control.
Although, Russian involvement officially escalated in 2012 after a failed attempt of a UN mandated ceasefire which proved futile for all parties involved. Russian kinetic involvement began in 2015 after an official request for support by the Bashar Al-Assad regime. On 30 September 2015, the first Russian airstrikes targeted Jaysh Al-Islam and the US backed FSA. Shortly after, reports of Wagner Group members in Syria started to appear in October 2015. These initial reports were vehemently denied by the Russian government no doubt due to the nebulous understanding of how PMCs are able to operate in a country’s constitution that forbids their existence in the first place. This outright denial is further explained when coupled with the fact that the group is attached to regular Russian forces at the onset of its involvement in a new conflict which would be unpopular had it been officially sanctioned regular ground forces in their stead. As with any nation, putting “boots on the ground” in an overseas war would draw ire from its own citizens. However, the flexibility that a PMC offers in terms of its personnel seemingly devoid of national identity replaced with a multinational one in the guise of capitalism, made its existence easier to swallow.
In December 2018, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the Wagner Group’s existence, stating, “They can work and pursue their business interests anywhere in the world as long as they are not violating Russia’s domestic norms and regulations.” Despite its unofficial status, Wagner has allowed Russia to expand its geopolitical influence through unconventional means.
The question remains: why has Russia not legalized PMCs despite their strategic value? While Wagner has demonstrated its effectiveness in Syria and beyond, formal recognition could expose the Russian government to legal and political consequences.