The Houthi Blitzkrieg
Yemen’s Iran aligned Houthi movement reached the strategic island of Perim in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Friday, completing a week long offensive that has fundamentally altered the balance of power along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline. According to four Yemeni government sources who spoke to Reuters, Houthi fighters crossed to the island, also known as Mayyun after Saudi backed government forces withdrew the previous day. The Houthis also captured the mainland coastal town of Dhubab, which faces the island, and had earlier seized the Red Sea port city of Mocha along with the Hanish islands. Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree claimed the operation, launched on September 3, covered 5,400 square kilometers across six districts and involved seven military brigades comprising 38 units.
He said hundreds of opposing fighters were killed, captured, or wounded, and that Houthi forces carried out 32 air defense operations, bringing down nine aircraft. An eyewitness in the area described gunmen “deploying along the Bab el-Mandeb shore and driving around in military vehicles”. The island of Perim, a 13 square kilometer volcanic outcrop, sits in the middle of the strait and divides it into two shipping lanes, making its capture symbolically and strategically significant. If the Houthis consolidate their control, it would give their backer Iran a critical advantage in its war with the United States, reducing supplies through a second major corridor alongside the already blockaded Strait of Hormuz.
A Fragmented Front and the Saudi-Emirati Rift
The Houthis’ rapid advance has exposed the profound dysfunction of the forces arrayed against them. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, described the situation as “a picture of a highly fragmented anti Houthi front,” arguing that different regional patrons had built competing networks and militias in southern Yemen rather than developing a unified force. He noted that the United Arab Emirates had spent years building its own networks in southern Yemen at Saudi Arabia’s expense, producing a fragmented front that now lacks a clear strategy, while the Houthis have been “extremely swift, very cohesive, with a very clear objective”. This fragmentation has deep roots. In December 2025, UAE backed Southern Transitional Council forces launched an offensive that briefly seized roughly half of Yemen’s territory, including the oil producing Hadramawt and al-Mahra governorates, before a Saudi backed counteroffensive reversed those gains and the STC announced its dissolution on January 9, 2026.
STC leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi was removed from Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council on charges of treason and fled to the UAE as his forces’ resistance collapsed. That earlier crisis pitted two of the internationally recognized government’s own backers against each other, and the wounds have not healed. The Houthi seizure of Mocha this week landed on top of an already difficult year for Saudi Arabia’s position in Yemen. Farea Al-Muslimi, a research fellow at Chatham House, said the Houthis’ rapid advance was not surprising given the poor coordination and weak armament of government forces, and that the group had built up its military capabilities over the past five years, a development that had been obscured by the 2022 truce.
The Counter-Offensive and Its Limits
Yemeni government forces have indicated they will attempt to retake the areas captured by the Houthis. Deputy Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Samir al-Sabri declared on official television that “the decision to liberate Sana’a has been finalized and taken decisively,” adding that government forces were advancing on several fronts. Government forces reported advances in the governorates of Al-Jawf, Al-Bayda, Taiz, and Al-Hudaydah, and the Giants Brigades claimed to have captured strategic positions in Al-Bayda. The Yemeni military reported carrying out 13 airstrikes against Houthi positions, vehicles, and gatherings in Al-Bayda. Government forces also announced the formation of a command center south of Mocha near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and said they would deploy weapons and aircraft to eliminate Houthi movement in strategic areas, including the road leading to Mocha.
However, the declarations do not mean government forces are close to entering Sana’a, with heavy fighting continuing across several fronts and both sides making competing claims about battlefield gains. The Houthis disputed government accounts of the fighting, saying they had repelled an advance towards the al-Labanat mountains in Al-Jawf and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. The counteroffensive has expanded into Al-Dhalea, Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda, suggesting government forces are attempting to stretch Houthi forces by opening several fronts simultaneously, but the Houthis have demonstrated remarkable resilience, having withstood years of devastating Saudi airstrikes during Yemen’s civil war.
Saudi Arabia’s Isolation
The Houthi advance has laid bare Saudi Arabia’s growing isolation. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called President Donald Trump at least twice on Thursday to request US military assistance in fighting the Houthis, according to two sources familiar with the matter. In the end, Washington told Riyadh it was not willing to take direct military action for now but would help with intelligence sharing and targeting. A senior administration official said the US was “focused on protecting our core national security interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, while empowering our regional partners to take the lead”.
A Second Chokepoint
The strategic implications of the Houthi advance extend far beyond Yemen’s borders. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, is effectively the southern gateway to the Suez Canal. At its narrowest point, the strait is only about 29 kilometers wide, with Perim dividing the passage into two channels. Before the Houthi escalation, an estimated 9.3 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products passed through Bab el-Mandeb in 2023. That figure fell to just 4.1 million barrels per day in 2024 and remained around 4.2 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025 as Houthi attacks forced ships to take the far longer route around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. Now, with the Strait of Hormuz also severely disrupted, traffic through that waterway has fallen to single digits in recent days, compared with around 125 large commercial vessels a day before the Iran war began, the world faces the prospect of simultaneous disruptions at two of its most critical maritime chokepoints. Oil prices have already reflected those concerns.
Brent crude briefly crossed $109 a barrel on Friday after jumping 6% on Thursday, and was still heading for a weekly gain of around 10%. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has relied on the Red Sea route since the Iran conflict effectively closed Hormuz, through which a fifth of global oil used to flow. But Saudi crude supply fell 2.3 million barrels per day in August to 6 million barrels per day, the lowest level in more than three decades, partly due to the targeting of ships transiting Bab el-Mandeb by Houthi linked groups. Satellite imagery verified by Reuters also showed smoke near Saudi Arabia’s East West oil pipeline, which has become a vital means for the kingdom to divert crude exports from Hormuz, a further potential setback for Riyadh. The Houthis have sought to reassure shipping companies that navigation remains safe for all vessels except Saudi ships subject to a previously announced ban.
Yemen’s Uncertain Future
For the Yemeni people, the renewed fighting has been nothing short of catastrophic. More than 22 million people require humanitarian assistance, and even before the recent escalation, Yemen had 5.2 million internally displaced persons and 18.3 million people who were acutely food insecure. The latest fighting has displaced approximately 18,000 households since the beginning of September alone, according to UN humanitarian workers, with hundreds of thousands more at risk along Yemen’s west coast. Yemen’s health system, already shattered by more than a decade of war, is facing yet another shock. An estimated 19.3 million people need health assistance in 2026, but resource constraints mean just 7.3 million have been prioritized for the most urgent response, and only 18% of the Health Cluster’s funding requirements are covered. UN operations in northern Yemen have been suspended since October 2025 following staff detentions and office raids, and the number of partner-supported health facilities has fallen by 63% since last year. The UN has voiced grave concern over the Houthi seizure of a humanitarian compound in Mocha, warning that humanitarian personnel and facilities must be protected. The UN’s deputy spokesperson, Farhan Haq, said 73 UN and NGO staff members remain detained in Yemen, with “no positive news” about their condition.
As for the political future, the prospects for peace appear dimmer than ever. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg has urged relevant parties to revive the stalled political process, but Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council chairman has ruled out any new truce with the Houthis. Iran, for its part, has called for an immediate return to negotiations, arguing that Yemen’s crisis cannot be resolved through military action or blockade. Whether the Houthis’ dramatic advance on the ground will translate into leverage at the negotiating table remains the central question.