Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, visited Pyongyang’s Liberation Tower on Friday, August 14, ahead of the 81st anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. The title “Supreme Leader” is grounded in the DPRK’s constitutional description of the President of the State Affairs Commission, while KCNA currently uses General Secretary of the WPK and President of the State Affairs of the DPRK as Kim’s principal formal offices.
At the monument, Kim laid a wreath carrying the inscription, “We will not forget the feats of the martyrs of the Soviet Army.” According to KCNA reporting relayed by Yonhap, he said the history, traditions and “ties of blood” between the DPRK and Russia had become a foundation for present-day friendship and cooperation, adding that their unity would continue across generations. Kim was accompanied by his wife, Ri Sol Ju, and his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, whose appearance marked her first known visit to the tower alongside him.
The ceremony was more than an anniversary observance. It placed the Soviet role in the final campaign against Imperial Japan alongside the DPRK’s own account of Korea’s anti-Japanese struggle, presenting both as part of a shared historical memory with contemporary political weight. President Vladimir Putin reinforced the same interpretation in his Liberation Day message to Kim, describing Korean patriots and Red Army soldiers as having fought together and saying their wartime cooperation laid the foundations for relations between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The Liberation Tower was erected in Pyongyang in 1947 to commemorate Soviet soldiers involved in the defeat of Japanese forces and the liberation of Korea at the end of the Second World War. Soviet forces entered northern Korea during the final offensive against Japan in August 1945, while Japan’s surrender on August 15 ended 35 years of colonial rule over the peninsula.
The monument has consequently occupied an unusual place in the DPRK’s historical landscape. Academic work on Soviet military monuments in the country notes that such sites developed not only as places of mourning, but also as physical representations of friendship and historical cooperation. The Liberation Tower has remained the most prominent of these memorial sites in Pyongyang, repeatedly receiving Russian delegations and DPRK commemorations even as relations between the two countries changed over the decades.
That symbolism has become considerably more important since Moscow and Pyongyang signed their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024. The agreement created a much firmer security relationship than the one that preceded it: Article 4 provides for military and other assistance if either state is subjected to an armed attack and enters a state of war. Both governments have subsequently described their relationship in increasingly explicit terms of strategic partnership, mutual assistance and alliance.
Kim’s Liberation Tower appearance therefore fits into a pattern rather than standing alone. He also visited the monument for the 80th anniversary in August 2025, paying tribute to Soviet servicemen and emphasizing the historical continuity of DPRK-Russia relations.
The clearest statement of Pyongyang’s emerging historical framework came several months earlier. During a May 9, 2025 visit to the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang for the 80th anniversary of Victory Day, Kim argued that without the Soviet victory of May 9, 1945, there would not have been Korea’s liberation on August 15. In the same address, he moved directly from the Second World War to the contemporary treaty relationship and the deployment of Korean People’s Army units alongside Russian forces in the Kursk region.
The military relationship has since become an openly commemorated part of relations between the two states. DPRK state media has acknowledged the participation of KPA combat units in the Kursk operation, while Russian officials have publicly honored Korean servicemen for their role. In April 2026, Russian state decorations were presented to KPA personnel who had participated in the operation, and Russian officials attended the opening of a Pyongyang memorial dedicated to the DPRK’s overseas military operations.
This gives the Liberation Day ceremonies a significance extending beyond historical remembrance. Pyongyang’s own public narrative increasingly draws a continuous line from Korean and Soviet sacrifice during the struggle against Japan, through the 2024 strategic treaty, to Korean and Russian soldiers operating within the same contemporary security framework. That continuity is an interpretation of the pattern in DPRK and Russian official messaging, but it is one that both governments have increasingly articulated themselves rather than leaving solely to outside analysts.
Putin’s message for the 81st anniversary made that connection again. He said relations had reached an “unprecedented” level of comprehensive strategic partnership and that the two countries were coordinating their efforts on regional security and stability. The Kremlin’s own published version independently confirms the substance of the message reported by KCNA.
The anniversary also comes immediately before another period of heightened military activity around the Korean Peninsula. The United States and the Republic of Korea are scheduled to begin the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise on August 17, with the allies describing the 11-day training period as defensive and intended to improve combined readiness.
The DPRK Foreign Ministry takes a different position, describing the exercises as preparation for an aggressive war and arguing that their scale and character require a corresponding increase in deterrence. In its August 14 statement, Pyongyang said it would respond to what it regards as a higher level of threat with a “new level of deterrent.”
These competing security narratives matter because the DPRK-Russia relationship is no longer confined to diplomacy, trade or ceremonial exchanges. The 2024 treaty contains a mutual-assistance provision, KPA forces have accumulated operational experience alongside Russian troops, and Moscow now openly describes cooperation with Pyongyang as part of its approach to regional security.
Against that background, the Liberation Tower is acquiring a second life. A monument built to preserve the memory of 1945 is now serving as a bridge between an older Soviet-Korean wartime relationship and a new strategic partnership taking shape in a very different international order. The wreath laid in Pyongyang this week was therefore not only directed toward the past; it also reflected how both capitals increasingly explain the political and military relationship they are building in the present.