Europe Rearms as the Post-Cold War Order Unravels
For more than three decades after the Cold War, European defence policy was shaped by a belief that large-scale war on the continent had become unlikely. Armed forces were reduced, conscription systems dismantled, and defence budgets treated as a residual category of public spending. The war in Ukraine in 2022 did not create this shift, but it abruptly ended the illusion that Europe could indefinitely rely on a low-cost security model.
Since then, rearmament has moved from emergency response to structural policy. Across the European Union, defence spending has been elevated from a political afterthought to a central pillar of state planning, with long-term consequences that extend beyond the conflict itself.
Defence Budgets Enter a New Phase
EU member states spent approximately €343 billion on defence in 2024, with collective spending projected to rise to around €381 billion in 2025. Compared to 2020, this represents an increase of more than 60 percent, marking the sharpest sustained rise in European military expenditure since the end of the Cold War.
This expansion reflects more than inflation or one-off aid packages. Defence spending as a share of GDP is now exceeding 2 percent on average across the EU, a threshold many governments resisted for years. Investment in defence research and development has also grown rapidly, signalling a shift toward long-term military capability rather than short-term replenishment alone.
Much of this momentum has been driven by NATO commitments and EU-level initiatives such as the €150 billion SAFE loan facility. While presented as technical measures to improve coordination and readiness, these decisions have often advanced faster than public debate, effectively locking in higher military spending as a structural feature of European governance.
An Uneven but Decisive Build-Up
The surge in defence spending has not been uniform.
Germany has undergone the most consequential shift in absolute terms, nearly doubling its defence budget since 2020 and abandoning long-standing political taboos around military investment. France has continued a steady upward trajectory, reinforcing its role as a core military power within Europe.
Poland stands out for the speed and scale of its expansion. Its defence spending has more than tripled since 2020, reflecting a strategic decision to prioritise deterrence and territorial defence. By contrast, Southern European states such as Spain have seen far more limited increases, constrained by domestic political and fiscal considerations.
Smaller states, particularly in Northern and Eastern Europe, have expanded from a lower base. While their budgets remain modest in absolute terms, the relative increases are substantial, underscoring how perceptions of risk vary sharply across the continent.
Preparing for Conflict Without a Strategy
Beyond budgets, European states are attempting to rebuild military manpower through recruitment drives, expanded reserve forces, and renewed debates over conscription. These efforts highlight a deeper shift toward sustained readiness rather than expeditionary crisis management.
Yet Europe’s rearmament remains largely reactive. Defence spending has risen faster than industrial coordination, manpower availability, or political consensus about the strategic end state this build-up is meant to serve. The EU is increasingly acting as a security actor without the institutional cohesion or democratic mandate normally associated with such a role.
The era of cheap defence is over. What remains unresolved is whether Europe’s accelerating militarisation will translate into long-term stability, or whether it reflects a deeper uncertainty about the continent’s place in an increasingly fragmented global order.