The Israeli-Arab War of Attrition 1967-1973: A Prelude to the October War

Following the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967, a new and complex phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged—one defined by a precarious state of "no war, no peace." Egypt’s political and military leadership concluded that a sustained low-intensity conflict with Israel was the most viable path to reclaiming lost territory, whether through diplomatic negotiations or force. The continuation of military engagement, they believed, served Egypt’s strategic interests, irrespective of the domestic or political costs.

The War of Attrition: 1967–1972

The War of Attrition, whose most intense phase lasted from 1967 to 1970 and resumed intermittently until 1972, preceded the full-scale October War of 1973. It featured a wide array of combat operations, including artillery duels, air battles, naval skirmishes, and special forces raids. Egypt's primary objective was to weaken Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula. While other nations such as Jordan and Syria were involved, the Sinai remained the principal battleground.

Origins of the Conflict

The roots of this phase lie in the aftermath of the June 1967 war, in which Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In a matter of days, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The defeat deeply humiliated Egypt and its Arab allies, causing significant psychological trauma and galvanizing a widespread belief that war was the only route to restoring national pride and sovereignty. The frontline shifted to the banks of the Suez Canal, separating Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Egypt’s strategy was straightforward: wear down Israeli forces through a relentless campaign of attrition, eroding their morale and resources. Conversely, Israel sought to maintain deterrence through overwhelming firepower and air superiority, consolidating its hold on occupied territory.

The Course of the War

Significant Egyptian victories came early. In 1967, the Egyptian Navy successfully sank the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat using a ship-to-ship missile—the first such use of this technology in combat. The attack, which resulted in the deaths of almost 50 Israeli sailors and wounded many more, marked Israel’s first naval loss of the conflict. In retaliation, Israel bombed strategic Egyptian infrastructure, including vital oil facilities.

Later that year, only sporadic clashes continued. In 1968, Jordan briefly reentered the fray during the Battle of Karameh. While the battle was a tactical success for Israel, the high casualties and chaotic execution discouraged further Jordanian engagement. Meanwhile, Egypt intensified inland raids and artillery shelling. That same year, Egypt suffered the loss of one of its most revered military figures, Chief of Staff Abdel Munim Riad, who was killed on the front.

By 1969, the war had escalated. The year saw the highest casualties to date, with increased aerial engagements and special operations. Notably, an Israeli F-4 Phantom jet was shot down for the first time, and Israeli commandos captured a Soviet-made P-12 radar system in a daring raid.

In 1970, operations took a more dramatic turn. Egyptian commandos infiltrated the Israeli port city of Eilat, sinking one supply ship and damaging another. Israel responded with an intensified air campaign aimed at breaking Egyptian resolve. However, this escalation came at a high humanitarian cost. An Israeli bombing raid struck a school, killing dozens of children, followed by an attack on a factory that claimed the lives of 80 more. These incidents triggered widespread condemnation, and the air campaign was subsequently curtailed.

That year also marked a significant defensive achievement for Egypt: the completion of the so-called "SAM Wall"—a network of surface-to-air missile batteries that dramatically increased the threat to Israeli aircraft. The Israeli Air Force suffered unsustainable losses, with 1970 becoming the deadliest year for F-4 Phantoms until the outbreak of the 1973 war.

Operation Rimon 20, an aerial engagement involving Soviet pilots flying Egyptian-marked aircraft, also occurred during this period. The operation ended disastrously for the Soviet side, as Israeli pilots, leveraging superior tactics, downed several Soviet-operated planes. It was a stark reminder of the challenges faced by foreign forces unfamiliar with the local air war dynamics.

Meanwhile, unrest spread across the occupied territories. Clashes erupted in the West Bank and near the Golan Heights, leading to the deaths of hundreds of Israeli soldiers and settlers. The Soviet Union also paid a steep price, with the deaths of dozens of military personnel—including colonels, technicians, and advisors—highlighting the depth of their involvement.

Strategy, Tactics, and Legacy

The Egyptian strategy was unambiguous: continuous pressure on Israeli forces had to be maintained at all costs. Through artillery, air defense systems, and commando raids, Egypt aimed to make the occupation of Sinai untenable. While territorial lines remained unchanged, the war’s message was clear: Israel’s dominance post-1967 was not absolute, and sustained resistance remained a viable option.

Israel was not expelled from the Sinai, but that was never the immediate goal. The military objectives set by Egypt’s General Staff—primarily to inflict damage and restore national confidence—were largely met. These experiences directly influenced Egypt’s preparations for the more ambitious October War in 1973.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the architect of Egypt’s post-1967 resistance, did not live to see the next phase of the conflict. He died of a heart attack in 1970. His successor, Anwar Sadat, would carry the torch—and lead Egypt into one of the most dramatic chapters of the Arab-Israeli saga.